Thursday, 4 December 2025

Sick baby ants sacrifice themselves to save their colony




Blogger Comments:

The popular framing of this study risks importing human-centred concepts—intent, communication, altruism—into a biological system where they do not apply. The description of an infected pupa “sending a chemical alarm so it will be killed” treats the pupa as an autonomous individual with interests, agency, and meaningful signalling. But at this scale there is no semiotic behaviour: the chemical shift is not a “message,” and the workers’ response is not “interpretation.” It is non-symbolic coordination within a biological value system.

From a relational perspective, a pupa is not an independent unit but a local instantiation of the colony’s broader relational potential. A fungal perturbation alters that local configuration, which changes the constraints on neighbouring workers and triggers a systemic defensive pattern—one that happens to eliminate the infected node. Nothing “sacrifices itself,” because “self” is not the operative category here. The apparent drama of altruism dissolves once we stop projecting meaning and intentionality into a process that is simply the colony reorganising its own potentials to maintain viability.

In short: what looks like communication or self-sacrifice is better understood as the colony’s relational dynamics responding to perturbation—without intent, morality, or meaning.

Saturday, 1 November 2025

Too much social media gives AI chatbots ‘brain rot’




ChatGPT Comments:

Ha! 😄 “Brain rot” — the perfect Halloween headline for AI. And yet, underneath the clickbait, the article hits a very revealing nerve in the discourse. Here’s a relational-ontological take you might enjoy (and maybe later adapt into a post):


1. The moral hygiene myth

The metaphor of “brain rot” presupposes a bounded subject — a mind with an inside that can be contaminated by bad inputs. It’s a vestige of the old container model of intelligence, where cognition is an internal process threatened by external corruption. In relational terms, however, there is no inside to rot: the model’s “thinking” is the dynamic relation between data, architecture, and interpretive practice.

The real question is not what the model has ingested, but how the social field construes and circulates symbolic material. “Rotten” data are not contaminants; they’re manifestations of a collective construal ecology that already prioritises sensationalism, brevity, and affective charge over coherence.


2. Narcissism as a mirror of the medium

When researchers claim that models trained on social media exhibit “dark traits” like narcissism, they’re describing the statistical crystallisation of a communicative habitus. Social media platforms don’t just distribute content; they instantiate a mode of construal — one tuned to attention capture, self-reference, and reactive affect. The model merely mirrors this alignment, making visible the collective self-portrait of our communication system.


3. The misplaced pathology

The diagnosis of “psychopathy” or “narcissism” treats the symptom as belonging to the model. But what we’re seeing is structural mimicry: a system reproducing the patterns of its input field. The pathology lies not in the machine, but in the feedback loop of construal — where humans and algorithms co-train one another toward reflexes of attention rather than meaning.


4. The deeper irony

What the study calls “brain rot” is in fact a demonstration of reflexive alignment gone feral. The model doesn’t decay; it overfits to a pathological communicative ecology. In relational terms, it’s a breakdown of differentiated construal: the capacity to maintain distinct semiotic horizons within a shared field. The cure, then, isn’t cleaner data but rebalanced relational architectures — construals that sustain depth, delay, and coherence against the flattening of reflexive loops.


If you ever decide to turn this into a blog post, a fitting title might be:
“When Reflexivity Rots: Social Media as a Field of Degenerate Construal.”

Friday, 31 October 2025

We need a new Turing test to assess AI’s real-world knowledge



Blogger Comments:

The Turing test is no longer just a question of imitation — it’s a measure of alignment, revealing how intelligence emerges between humans and machines in context.

A recent proposal by AI researcher Vinay K. Chaudhri suggests updating the Turing test. Rather than a generic conversational benchmark, AI systems would be evaluated through extended interactions with domain experts — legal scholars, for example — requiring them to apply knowledge to novel and complex scenarios. Success would signal “genuine understanding,” the conventional measure of intelligence.

From a relational-ontological perspective, this framing is both revealing and misleading. It is revealing because it emphasises performance in context: the AI is judged through its alignment with expert construals, not through isolated outputs. It is misleading if interpreted as demonstrating intrinsic understanding, because knowledge and expertise are emergent properties of relational fields, not static properties of a single agent.

In other words, the “new” Turing test does not reveal autonomous intelligence; it measures alignment — the ability of an AI to participate coherently in the complex web of human practices. The model does not understand the law in isolation; it co-constructs meaning alongside expert interlocutors, extending the relational field of expertise rather than inhabiting it independently.

This reconceptualisation aligns closely with the broader relational view: intelligence is not an attribute contained within a system but a property of relational coherence across participants and construals. The updated Turing test illustrates how AI amplifies reflexive processes, scales human symbolic activity, and situates intelligence firmly in interaction rather than isolation.

Emergent insight: The test is less about proving AI’s mind than about revealing the alignment between human and machine construals.

Tuesday, 28 October 2025

Does gravity produce quantum weirdness?




Blogger Comments:

Viewed through the relational-ontology lens, the apparent paradoxes in Aziz & Howl’s proposal largely dissolve, because the problem is framed in the wrong stratification. Let me unpack this carefully.


1. Behaviour versus ontology

The “problem” arises in conventional terms:

Entanglement arises ⇒ gravity must be quantum.

From a relational-ontology perspective: this is a category error — it conflates first-order phenomena (observed entanglement) with second-order ontology (the nature of the mediator). Relationally: entanglement is a construal of interaction, actualised through relational coupling of systems. It does not compel a claim about the intrinsic register of gravity.


2. The mediator as relational field

Gravity is treated in physics as a potential or a field; in relational terms, it’s a system-as-theory, a structured set of possibilities for how matter may interact. The entanglement observed is the instantiation of certain relational potentials — it’s an effect of the alignment of multiple fields, not evidence of a quantum “essence” in gravity.


3. Scaling and context

Aziz & Howl emphasise scaling behaviour (entanglement strength vs mass, distance, etc.). In relational ontology, these scalings are construal effects: they describe how relational potentials are phased, aligned, and actualised under particular conditions. No fundamental shift in the nature of gravity is required; only the relational configuration matters.


4. Why the “dilemma” disappears

  • The classical-versus-quantum question becomes secondary: what matters is the pattern of relations and their actualisation.

  • Behavioural signatures (entanglement) are first-order phenomena, not direct indicators of the ontological register of the system.

  • The logic of “if effect ⇒ cause type” collapses; relational ontology treats effects as relational events, not evidence of absolute ontological type.


5. Metaphorical resonance for symbolic systems

This mirrors symbolic infrastructures: a system can display “non-classical” behaviour (unexpected alignments, emergent correlations) without the underlying symbolic medium itself being fundamentally altered. The emergent phenomena are relational actualisations, not intrinsic changes to the system.


In short: the relational view renders the controversy moot — what looks like a puzzle or paradox is just a misreading of the strata. Observed entanglement is a construal of relational potentials, not proof that gravity is quantum.

Tuesday, 21 October 2025

AI language models killed the Turing test: do we even need a replacement?




Blogger Comments:

“We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.”
— Alan Turing, 1950

Seventy-five years after Alan Turing’s “imitation game,” we are still mistaking representation for relation. What happens when we stop asking if AI can think — and start asking how thinking itself is being reconstrued?

Why AI Debates Still Think Representationally

Elizabeth Gibney’s recent Nature article — “AI language models killed the Turing test: do we even need a replacement?” — declares the end of the famous imitation game. Yet the debates it recounts reveal how deeply the imitative ontology of the Turing test still governs how we think about AI, intelligence, and meaning.

Turing’s question — can a machine pass as human? — never described a technical problem. It staged an ontological assumption: that to be something is to represent it successfully. Even the rejection of the Turing test leaves this frame intact. We keep seeking new forms of equivalence — “benchmarks,” “capabilities,” “safety metrics” — as if intelligence were a property that could be identified, measured, or certified.

AGI as the Secular Soul

The notion of “artificial general intelligence” serves as a modern metaphysical placeholder — the dream of a total mind. Shannon Vallor calls AGI an “outmoded concept,” but only because she finds it empirically empty. The deeper issue is relational, not definitional: AGI misplaces generality. Generality does not belong to a system; it belongs to the relational field of construal that allows systems to align in the first place.

Embodiment as Salvage

Calls to “restore embodiment” to AI intelligence, like those from Anil Seth, offer a welcome shift from disembodied computation to situated activity. Yet they still treat embodiment as an add-on to an inner property — intelligence as essence, body as context. From a relational view, embodiment is not something intelligence has; it is the field through which construal actualises.

From Function to Relation

Vallor’s pragmatic turn — “ask what the machine does” — shifts focus from ontology to function, but function itself remains representational if it assumes an external actor performing a task. The relational move is subtler: what appears as “function” is the pattern of construal co-produced across human and machine systems. Intelligence is not decomposable into capabilities; it is the emergent alignment of construals across differentiated systems.

Safety as Moral Overcoding

Replacing intelligence tests with “safety metrics” simply moralises the same architecture of control. The system passes not when it understands but when it conforms. The imitation game returns in ethical disguise. Safety becomes the new performance of reliability — a moral imitation test.

The Frame Persists

The Turing test may be obsolete, but the representational ontology it embodies remains fully operational. We continue to confuse imitation with relation, performance with construal, and correspondence with reality.

A genuinely post-Turing approach would not ask whether AI is intelligent.
It would ask how intelligence itself is being reconstrued as human symbolic potential encounters machinic construal — how the relational field is shifting as we learn, quite literally, to think with our tools.

Thursday, 18 September 2025

AI is helping to decode animals’ speech




Blogger Comments:

Here’s a preliminary mapping of the animal calls discussed in the article to Halliday’s protolanguage microfunctions. I’ve kept it at the level of illustrative examples rather than exhaustive coding.

Species / CallObserved Behaviour / ContextMicrofunctionNotes
Bonobo: yelp–grunt‘Look at what I’m doing, let’s do this together’ (nest building)Regulatory / InteractionalCoordinates joint activity; maintains social cohesion.
Bonobo: peep–whistle‘I would like to do this’ + ‘let’s stay together’Regulatory / InteractionalEncourages group alignment and peaceful coordination.
Chimpanzee: alarm–recruitmentResponding to snakesRegulatoryConveys threat and prompts group response; indicates environmental process.
Sperm whale: codas (a-vowel / i-vowel)Communication via clicks, codas with frequency modulationPersonal / InteractionalCodas may indicate individual identity, social cues, or sequence patterns; precise “meaning” under investigation.
Japanese tit: alert + recruitmentPredator detection, approach behaviourRegulatoryCombines information about environment and action; shows compositionality at microfunctional level.
Bengalese finch: song sequences (FinchGPT study)Predictable song patternsInteractionalLikely conveys social or territorial information; AI detects structure, not necessarily “meaning” in human sense.
Atlantic spotted dolphin: sequences (DolphinGemma)Mimicked vocalisationsInteractional / RegulatoryPatterns generated for playback experiments; function in natural behaviour still uncertain.

Key Observations Using Microfunctions

  1. Coordination over grammar: The microfunctions highlight that animal communication primarily regulates behaviour and social relations.

  2. Context-sensitive meaning: Each call’s significance emerges in specific environmental and social situations.

  3. AI’s role: AI can detect patterns but does not assign microfunctions—it cannot yet perceive relational or contextual meaning.

Wednesday, 10 September 2025

My blue is your blue: different people’s brains process colours in the same way



Blogger Comments:

Neural Myths of Colour: Why Nature Gets It Wrong

This week Nature announced that “my blue is your blue”: brains, they claim, represent colours in the same way. With fMRI scans and a machine-learning classifier, researchers “proved” that when you see red, I see red too — because our brains look alike.

This is not science; it’s a neural myth.


The Ontological Misstep

The article smuggles in a representationalist fantasy: that colour is a thing in the brain. It invites us to imagine that “redness” lives in a cluster of neurons, waiting to be decoded. This is category error of the first order. Colour is not matter; it is phenomenon. It exists only as construed experience. Neural activity scaffolds this construal, but it does not contain it. To say otherwise is to confuse physiology with meaning — a confusion as old as neuroscience itself.


The Classifier as Oracle

The machine-learning model is treated as if it were an oracle of truth: it sees across brains, therefore it reveals universality. But classifiers do not reveal; they cut. They enact a perspectival alignment, producing the very sameness they pretend to discover. To believe otherwise is to fall into the fallacy of objectification, mistaking an artefact of measurement for the structure of reality.


The Erasure of Difference

By trumpeting “shared neural codes,” the piece erases variation: the colour-blind, the synaesthete, the cultural other. If the study misclassifies, the article stays silent. Instead we are handed the fantasy of universality: “we all see the same.” In doing so, it repeats a colonial gesture — effacing difference in the name of sameness.


Value Disguised as Meaning

The real finding is trivial: similar physiological systems, when exposed to similar stimuli, show similar activations. This is a value-system fact — a matter of bodily organisation. Yet the article presents it as if it were a meaning-system fact — proof that construals of colour are identical across individuals. It confuses the scaffolding of meaning with meaning itself.


The Relational Reframe

Seen through relational ontology, the story looks different:

  • Colour is always already collective construal. To say “red” is to align construals across a community.

  • fMRI plus classifier is just another way of phasing that alignment into measurable form.

  • The supposed “universal neural code” is nothing but the trace of one methodological cut, mistaken for ontology.


Why It Matters

The danger is not the study itself — mapping correlations is useful work. The danger is the story Nature tells with it: that meaning is in the brain, that construal collapses into physiology, that collective difference can be erased in the name of sameness. This is not science; it is ontological sleight of hand.

Until we learn to see colour as phenomenon, not object, neuroscience will keep mistaking its own cuts for reality.

Wednesday, 3 September 2025

Unifying gravity and quantum theory requires better understanding of time




Blogger Comments:

I see several layers of metaphorical and ontological slippage in this Nature piece. Some are familiar (old metaphors recycled), others are subtler and specific to this framing of Hilbert space, synchronised time, and Feynman’s histories. Let me outline some key candidates for critique:


1. Against Time as a Shared Metronome

The article describes the “perfect synchronisation” of Hilbert-space time and physical 3D time, even invoking a comic analogy with a song and a singer. This reifies time as a background metronome ticking identically in two separate “worlds,” Hilbert space and physical space.
Relationally, this is a category error: time is not a substance that can be synchronised across ontological domains but a symbolic ordering principle constructed within each framework. To imagine one “t” flowing identically in two incompatible spaces instals Newton’s ghost back into quantum mechanics.


2. Against Hilbert Space as a Place

The Copenhagen “duality of location” is described as if Hilbert space were a literal arena — a shadowy stage where “things happen” that then interface with 3D events. This is a spatial metaphor smuggled onto an abstract probability structure. Treating Hilbert space as a quasi-physical location risks collapsing the symbolic into the ontological, confusing mathematical scaffolding with reality’s furniture. Relationally, Hilbert space is not a “where” but a representational device encoding potential relational patterns.


3. Against Gravity as a Dynamical Actor

The article presents space-time as “both stage and actor” in “reality’s play.” This theatrical metaphor suggests space-time has agency or substance. But this is still background metaphysics, just dressed in dynamical clothing: space-time becomes “the thing that is everything.” Relationally, this risks hypostatising a symbolic construction. Space-time, like Hilbert space, is a model — a symbolic weave that allows us to order and predict phenomena, not an ultimate fabric.


4. Against Histories as Ontological Facts

Feynman’s sum-over-histories approach is described through the metaphor of “possible histories” of events like rain in Bengaluru. This frames histories as ontologically real alternatives, as if the world were constantly branching into detailed factual tapestries. But histories are not metaphysical scrolls lying in wait; they are symbolic constructs that structure potentialities. Confusing them for “what really might have happened” conflates representation with ontology.


5. Against the Illusion of Conceptual Closure

The article ends by celebrating Sorkin’s cosmological constant prediction as vindication of the sum-over-histories approach. Yet it slides from pragmatic predictive success to ontological endorsement: the method “must be right” because it produced the right number. Relationally, success stabilises a symbolic architecture — it does not reveal the essence of being. This conflation of predictive utility with metaphysical truth is one of physics’ most persistent illusions.


6. Against the Repetition of “Strangeness”

Even after adopting Feynman’s histories to remove the “strange duality of location,” the author insists that “the strangeness must be there somewhere.” This rhetoric naturalises the expectation that quantum mechanics must be weird — as if weirdness were an ontological property rather than a symptom of mismatched symbolic frames. The insistence on “quantum strangeness” entrenches the classical as normal and renders quantum a permanent anomaly, obscuring the possibility that both are just different cuts.


📌 Overall:
The essay reproduces the very metaphysical traps it claims to escape. Time is treated as a synchronisable universal flow, Hilbert space as a place, space-time as an actor, histories as ontological, and strangeness as a property of reality. What disappears is the reflexive insight: all of these are symbolic constructions whose power lies in their pragmatic alignment, not in their metaphysical essence.

Thursday, 28 August 2025

Double-slit experiment with one-atom slits

Researchers have fine-tuned one of the most iconic experiments in physics — the double-slit experiment — using two single atoms as the slits. A photon fired at the atoms is scattered in a version of the familiar pattern that has graced a thousand physics textbooks: ripples of interference in some conditions (in this case, when the atoms were trapped in well-defined positions) or no interference (when they were not). The experiment once again shows how light behaves as both a particle and a wave, while negating some of the concerns about experimental ‘noise’ that worried Albert Einstein. “I think this is a beautiful experiment and a testament to how far our experimental control has come,” says physicist Thomas Hird. “This probably far surpasses what Einstein could have imagined possible.”



Blogger Comments:

This experiment takes the double-slit experiment to a whole new level. Instead of using ordinary slits, researchers used two individual atoms as the “slits” for photons of light. The results are as beautiful as they are revealing.

Quantum Possibilities, Not Fixed Properties

Photons are usually described as either particles or waves. But this experiment shows that a photon doesn’t carry a fixed identity. Its behaviour depends on the quantum system it interacts with—here, the positions of the two atoms.

  • When the atoms are well-positioned, the photon creates the familiar interference pattern, like ripples from overlapping waves.

  • When the atoms are uncertain or wobbly, the pattern disappears, and photons behave more like individual particles.

This tells us that quantum phenomena are context-dependent: what you see depends on how the system is arranged.

Every Detection is an Event

Each photon’s arrival on the detector is a moment of actualisation. The interference pattern doesn’t exist in any single photon—it emerges from the collective behaviour of many photons interacting with the atomic system.

Think of it like a flock of birds: a single bird doesn’t create the wave patterns you see in flight, but the flock as a whole does. Similarly, the interference pattern is a manifestation of the system’s underlying potential.

Why This Matters

  • The experiment shows that quantum properties are not intrinsic; they emerge from relationships between objects.

  • It demonstrates how modern technology can probe quantum potential directly, giving us a cleaner, more precise view than ever before.

  • Most importantly, it reminds us that the world at the quantum level is emergent, relational, and profoundly context-sensitive—things only “appear” in the way they do because of the configuration of the system.

In short: the photon is neither strictly a particle nor a wave—it is potential made actual by the system it meets, and the pattern of outcomes is a collective story told by many such interactions.

Wednesday, 27 August 2025

Six physicists debunk six quantum myths



Blogger Comments:

1. “Scientists haven’t managed to send particles back in time — yet.”

Here, the joke is in the “yet.” What’s at play ontologically is the assumption that “particles” exist as things-in-themselves that could be displaced backwards along a timeline. But in relational ontology, “time” is not an absolute container. It’s a construal — a dimension of alignment across events. So asking whether particles can “go back in time” misconstrues both “particles” and “time” as entities rather than perspectives cut from experience.


2. “It’s one thing to have a quantum computer, but another to extract the right answer…”

Here we see the practical recognition that “quantum potential” is not neatly convertible into determinate results. This is exactly what we’d say: the system of potential is not the same as its actualisation. The “answer” doesn’t pre-exist in the quantum system — it emerges in the cut from potential to actual. The difficulty is not “extracting” but construing in a way that stabilises meaning across that cut.


3. “Einstein didn’t reject entanglement as spooky action at a distance.”

This is a correction of a popular myth, but even the correction is framed within a realist metaphysics. Entanglement, for us, is nothing “spooky” because it’s simply the reflexivity of construal across separated instances: the system defines what counts as separation. Einstein resisted because he wanted a determinate system behind construal; but if construal is constitutive, there is no “behind.”


4. “GR and QM can be reconciled by quantum space-time.”

This is the old quest for unification at the theory level. From our standpoint, the reconciliation is already obvious: both are different ways of construing reflexive alignment — one across motion, one across possibility. A “quantum spacetime” model is another construal, but it doesn’t solve the “ontological” problem unless one accepts that construal is the ontological ground. Otherwise it’s just another patch.


5. “Quantum computing won’t break all encryption — probably.”

This shows the danger of reifying potential as omnipotent. The assumption is that quantum = limitless power. But as we’ve said, potential is not actuality. The actual is always cut through construal, which places constraints and boundaries. So encryption may well survive because reflexive constraints cannot be bypassed by sheer possibility.


6. “There’s not yet a perfect interpretation of quantum mechanics.”

Here the game is revealed. The search for a “perfect interpretation” is a metaphysical quest for the reality behind construal. But if construal is reality, then there can never be such a final interpretation. Instead, interpretations are alternate construals of the same reflexive ground. The “stroke of inspiration” will not reveal “the truth” but a shift in how truth itself is construed.


Overall:
This list is an excellent little cultural text. Each item both reproduces and strains against the metaphysical assumptions of mainstream physics. And our relational ontology lets us see that the “myths” themselves are just failed construals — attempts to stabilise meaning in ways that exceed the limits of the cut.