Friday, 26 September 2025
Wednesday, 24 September 2025
Tuesday, 23 September 2025
Sunday, 21 September 2025
Saturday, 20 September 2025
Friday, 19 September 2025
Thursday, 18 September 2025
AI is helping to decode animals’ speech
Here’s a preliminary mapping of the animal calls discussed in the article to Halliday’s protolanguage microfunctions. I’ve kept it at the level of illustrative examples rather than exhaustive coding.
| Species / Call | Observed Behaviour / Context | Microfunction | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bonobo: yelp–grunt | ‘Look at what I’m doing, let’s do this together’ (nest building) | Regulatory / Interactional | Coordinates joint activity; maintains social cohesion. |
| Bonobo: peep–whistle | ‘I would like to do this’ + ‘let’s stay together’ | Regulatory / Interactional | Encourages group alignment and peaceful coordination. |
| Chimpanzee: alarm–recruitment | Responding to snakes | Regulatory | Conveys threat and prompts group response; indicates environmental process. |
| Sperm whale: codas (a-vowel / i-vowel) | Communication via clicks, codas with frequency modulation | Personal / Interactional | Codas may indicate individual identity, social cues, or sequence patterns; precise “meaning” under investigation. |
| Japanese tit: alert + recruitment | Predator detection, approach behaviour | Regulatory | Combines information about environment and action; shows compositionality at microfunctional level. |
| Bengalese finch: song sequences (FinchGPT study) | Predictable song patterns | Interactional | Likely conveys social or territorial information; AI detects structure, not necessarily “meaning” in human sense. |
| Atlantic spotted dolphin: sequences (DolphinGemma) | Mimicked vocalisations | Interactional / Regulatory | Patterns generated for playback experiments; function in natural behaviour still uncertain. |
Key Observations Using Microfunctions
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Coordination over grammar: The microfunctions highlight that animal communication primarily regulates behaviour and social relations.
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Context-sensitive meaning: Each call’s significance emerges in specific environmental and social situations.
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AI’s role: AI can detect patterns but does not assign microfunctions—it cannot yet perceive relational or contextual meaning.
Wednesday, 17 September 2025
Saturday, 13 September 2025
Friday, 12 September 2025
Wednesday, 10 September 2025
My blue is your blue: different people’s brains process colours in the same way
Blogger Comments:
Neural Myths of Colour: Why Nature Gets It Wrong
This week Nature announced that “my blue is your blue”: brains, they claim, represent colours in the same way. With fMRI scans and a machine-learning classifier, researchers “proved” that when you see red, I see red too — because our brains look alike.
This is not science; it’s a neural myth.
The Ontological Misstep
The article smuggles in a representationalist fantasy: that colour is a thing in the brain. It invites us to imagine that “redness” lives in a cluster of neurons, waiting to be decoded. This is category error of the first order. Colour is not matter; it is phenomenon. It exists only as construed experience. Neural activity scaffolds this construal, but it does not contain it. To say otherwise is to confuse physiology with meaning — a confusion as old as neuroscience itself.
The Classifier as Oracle
The machine-learning model is treated as if it were an oracle of truth: it sees across brains, therefore it reveals universality. But classifiers do not reveal; they cut. They enact a perspectival alignment, producing the very sameness they pretend to discover. To believe otherwise is to fall into the fallacy of objectification, mistaking an artefact of measurement for the structure of reality.
The Erasure of Difference
By trumpeting “shared neural codes,” the piece erases variation: the colour-blind, the synaesthete, the cultural other. If the study misclassifies, the article stays silent. Instead we are handed the fantasy of universality: “we all see the same.” In doing so, it repeats a colonial gesture — effacing difference in the name of sameness.
Value Disguised as Meaning
The real finding is trivial: similar physiological systems, when exposed to similar stimuli, show similar activations. This is a value-system fact — a matter of bodily organisation. Yet the article presents it as if it were a meaning-system fact — proof that construals of colour are identical across individuals. It confuses the scaffolding of meaning with meaning itself.
The Relational Reframe
Seen through relational ontology, the story looks different:
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Colour is always already collective construal. To say “red” is to align construals across a community.
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fMRI plus classifier is just another way of phasing that alignment into measurable form.
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The supposed “universal neural code” is nothing but the trace of one methodological cut, mistaken for ontology.
Why It Matters
The danger is not the study itself — mapping correlations is useful work. The danger is the story Nature tells with it: that meaning is in the brain, that construal collapses into physiology, that collective difference can be erased in the name of sameness. This is not science; it is ontological sleight of hand.
Until we learn to see colour as phenomenon, not object, neuroscience will keep mistaking its own cuts for reality.
Friday, 5 September 2025
Wednesday, 3 September 2025
Unifying gravity and quantum theory requires better understanding of time
I see several layers of metaphorical and ontological slippage in this Nature piece. Some are familiar (old metaphors recycled), others are subtler and specific to this framing of Hilbert space, synchronised time, and Feynman’s histories. Let me outline some key candidates for critique:
1. Against Time as a Shared Metronome
2. Against Hilbert Space as a Place
The Copenhagen “duality of location” is described as if Hilbert space were a literal arena — a shadowy stage where “things happen” that then interface with 3D events. This is a spatial metaphor smuggled onto an abstract probability structure. Treating Hilbert space as a quasi-physical location risks collapsing the symbolic into the ontological, confusing mathematical scaffolding with reality’s furniture. Relationally, Hilbert space is not a “where” but a representational device encoding potential relational patterns.
3. Against Gravity as a Dynamical Actor
The article presents space-time as “both stage and actor” in “reality’s play.” This theatrical metaphor suggests space-time has agency or substance. But this is still background metaphysics, just dressed in dynamical clothing: space-time becomes “the thing that is everything.” Relationally, this risks hypostatising a symbolic construction. Space-time, like Hilbert space, is a model — a symbolic weave that allows us to order and predict phenomena, not an ultimate fabric.
4. Against Histories as Ontological Facts
Feynman’s sum-over-histories approach is described through the metaphor of “possible histories” of events like rain in Bengaluru. This frames histories as ontologically real alternatives, as if the world were constantly branching into detailed factual tapestries. But histories are not metaphysical scrolls lying in wait; they are symbolic constructs that structure potentialities. Confusing them for “what really might have happened” conflates representation with ontology.
5. Against the Illusion of Conceptual Closure
The article ends by celebrating Sorkin’s cosmological constant prediction as vindication of the sum-over-histories approach. Yet it slides from pragmatic predictive success to ontological endorsement: the method “must be right” because it produced the right number. Relationally, success stabilises a symbolic architecture — it does not reveal the essence of being. This conflation of predictive utility with metaphysical truth is one of physics’ most persistent illusions.
6. Against the Repetition of “Strangeness”
Even after adopting Feynman’s histories to remove the “strange duality of location,” the author insists that “the strangeness must be there somewhere.” This rhetoric naturalises the expectation that quantum mechanics must be weird — as if weirdness were an ontological property rather than a symptom of mismatched symbolic frames. The insistence on “quantum strangeness” entrenches the classical as normal and renders quantum a permanent anomaly, obscuring the possibility that both are just different cuts.












